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Abstract
The History of International Law lacks systematic studies on the link between legal 
scholars and practices of justifying war. This missing analytical link has for a long time 
given the impression that legal scholars describe ‘state practice’ in an ‘objective’, un-
political way. Contradicting this impression, the article turns to the politics of legal 
scholars in the genesis of the modern war discourse. It reflects on the fateful entangle-
ment of violence, law and politics, but nevertheless distinguishes between ‘objective’ 
and ‘political’ scholarship on the basis of Hans Kelsen’s work. Furthermore, the article 
illustrates the politicisability of legal scholars in selected historical cases of the ‘long 
19th century’ (1789–1918). In all cases, two hearts pounded in lawyers’ chests: one sci-
entific, the other political. As will be shown, the modern war discourse is shaped by 
a phenomenon that enables scholars to expand the intrinsic limits to the political in-
strumentalisation of law: ‘multi-normativity’.
Keywords
politics and law – International Legal Scholarship – modern war discourse – Ius ad 
Bellum – ‘long 19th Century’ – multi-normativity – nationalism – Kelsen
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1 Introduction: The Politics of Legal Knowledge – A Missing Link in 
the History of War Justifications
Paradoxically or not, at the core of the discipline of (the History of) Inter-
national Law lies a phenomenon of a highly political nature: the entangle-
ment of the justification and the critique of violence.1 Hence, the historical 
reconstructions of war discourses have been constitutive for the emergence 
of international law as a scientific discipline.2 However, an analytical imbal-
ance in favour of doctrinal histories can clearly be identified. To fill the gap be-
tween practice and theory is highly important for the further orientation of the 
History of International Law in its own right.3 As part of such an endeavour, 
the present article focusses on a specific aspect of the analytical gap between 
theory and practice: It reflects on the politics of legal knowledge in historical 
war discourses.
The History of International Law is not only lacking insights into the role 
of norms in political practices of justifying war4 – it also lacks systematic and 
comparative studies on the link between legal scholars and politics in this 
particular policy field.5 Legal scholars are the primary authors of writing legal 
histories – and at the same time, they are their primary historical sources. For 
a long time, this dual role has given the impression that doctrine describes 
and systematises ‘state practice’ in an ‘objective’ way.6 But instead, the result-
ing doctrinal histories and narratives largely miss reflection on what Reinhart 
1   Brock, Lothar and Hendrik Simon, eds. The Justification of War and International Order. From 
Past to Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
2   Neff, Stephen C. War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).
3   Tischer, Anuschka. Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen in der Frühen Neuzeit: Herrscherkom-
munikation in Europa zwischen Souveränität und korporativem Selbstverständnis (Berlin: LIT-
Verlag, 2012); Payk, Marcus M. Frieden durch Recht? Der Aufstieg des modernen Völkerrechts 
und der Friedensschluss nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018); Benton, Lauren. 
‘Beyond Anachronism: Histories of International Law and Global Legal Politics’. Journal of the 
History of International Law 21(1) (2019), 7–40, doi: 10.1163/15718050-12340100.
4   Brock/Simon, Justification of War forthcoming (n. 1).
5   A textbook example is Grotius’ work for the Dutch East India Company in the 17th cen-
tury, see Van Ittersum, Martine Julia. ‘The Long Goodbye: Hugo Grotius’ Justification of 
Dutch Expansion Overseas, 1615–1645’. History of European Ideas 36(4) (2010), 386–411; and 
Hathaway, Oona A. and Scott Shapiro. The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw 
War Remade the World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), Chapter 1.
6   See also the critique in Carty, Anthony. ‘Doctrine versus State Practice’, in Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law, eds. Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 972–996.
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Koselleck has called a scholar’s personal Standpunkt (‘viewpoint’) and its influ-
ence on the way scholars ‘observe’ international law.7
If legal scholars’ preferences are to be taken more seriously in the policy field 
of war and peace, a couple of fundamental questions arise: Firstly and funda-
mentally, which role do politics play in the shaping of discourses on war and 
international order by legal scholars? Secondly, do scholars ‘objectively’ antici-
pate, accompany or synthesise8 the debates? Or are they themselves political 
actors in their legal interpretation of certain cases – and if so: for what reason? 
Thirdly, which normative concepts shape their political agenda of justifying 
or criticising the use of force? Do they refer to law or do they try to by-pass it?
Reflecting on these questions in historical context seems decisive for the 
investigation of perhaps ‘the most difficult problem of the scientific treatment 
of international law in its history’,9 the relationship between political practice 
and international legal doctrine or, in other words: the ‘power-knowledge nex-
us’10 in the legal history of war discourses. Far from being able to offer general 
or even final answers to this problem here, the article addresses this nexus, 
and it does so in the following way: It first develops a distinction between 
‘objective’ and ‘political’ scholars on the basis of Hans Kelsen’s work (2.). It 
then turns to concrete case studies of the ‘long 19th century’ (3.) (3.1: French 
Revolutionary Wars; 3.2: German Unification Wars; 3.3: Russo-Turkish Wars), 
before some conclusions from these case studies are summarised in a broader 
historical outlook (4.).
The article’s central thesis is that throughout modernity (1789 onwards), in-
ternational lawyers have been exposed to a tension between the values and 
norms of the international legal community and national political interests. 
This has tended to politicise legal scholarship. How this tension came about 
will be illustrated with historical examples: To the extent that it corresponded 
to their political aims, the lawyers in the focus of this article referred to positive 
law and tried to interpret it according to their political preferences. However, 
where it appeared useful, they referred to different normative orders, which 
competed for authority in debates on the legitimacy of force.
7    Koselleck, Reinhart. Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 10th ed., 2017).
8    Janssen, Wilhelm. Die Anfänge des modernen Völkerrechts und der neuzeitlichen 
Diplomatie: Ein Forschungsbericht (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1965).
9    Steiger, Heinhard. ‘Ius belli in der Völkerrechtsgeschichte – Universelle Geltung oder 
Beschränkung auf „anerkannte Kulturvölker“?’, in Legalität, Legitimität und Moral. Können 
Gerechtigkeitspostulate Kriege rechtfertigen?, eds. Thomas Bruha, Sebastian Heselhaus 
and Thilo Marauhn (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 59–98, 62.
10   Foucault, Michel. L’Archéologie du Savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1969).
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As will be argued, this ‘multi-normativity’11 shapes the entire modern war 
discourse down to the present day, thus providing a useful political instrument 
for jurists to circumvent the authority of law if deemed necessary. How did the 
ambivalence between legal scholarship and politics develop in the ‘long 19th 
century’ (1789–1918), the birth era of both modern war discourse and modern 
international order? This question is at the heart of the present article.
2 Legal Scholarship as a Political Vocation? Ordering War between 
Scientific Impartiality and ‘National’ Interests
In 1951, Hans Kelsen published an article in The American Political Science 
Review entitled ‘Science and Politics’ (the dichotomy is already revealing). 
Kelsen stated ‘that the search for truth, which is the essential function of sci-
ence, should not be influenced by political interests’; he characterised the latter 
as ‘a function of will’.12 Echoing Immanuel Kant’s normative telos of positive 
law and thus positioning himself in the liberal tradition of ius contra bellum,13 
Kelsen argued that avoiding ‘the mingling of these two heterogeneous spheres 
[– the legal and the political –] is as essential for the preservation of the scien-
tific character of jurisprudence as the separation of science from politics is a 
vital condition for the existence of all independent science’; Kelsen concluded 
that the
postulation of the separation of the science of positive law from poli-
tics means that the legal scientist, in describing his object, must refrain 
from political value judgments as judgments referring to norms other 
than norms of positive law, especially from evaluating his object as just 
or unjust.14
This is a textbook definition of the positivist legal scientist in the spirit of 
Kant’s legal philosophy: Accordingly, the emergence of positive law is not only 
11   Vec, Miloš. ‘Multinormativität in der Rechtsgeschichte’, in Jahrbuch 2008 (Berlin: Berlin-
Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 155–166; Duve, Thomas. ‘Was 
ist “Multinormativität”? Einführende Bemerkungen’. Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History 25 
(2017), 88–101.
12   Kelsen, Hans. ‘Science and Politics’. The American Political Science Review 45(3) (1951), 
641–661, 641.
13   Kelsen, Hans. Peace through Law (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1944).
14   Kelsen, Science 1951 (n. 12), 661.
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the best evidence for the emergence of ‘objective’ truth,15 the reference to posi-
tive law is also the best evidence for an ‘objective’ legal scientist.
However, in an earlier article published in the Juristische Wochenschrift in 
1929, Kelsen had expressed scepticism about legal scholars’ actual political in-
dependence. He feared that public law scholarship provided ‘the “objectivity” 
that no politics is able to generate on its own’. Kelsen assumed that interna-
tional legal scholarship in his time acted as a mouthpiece for the powerful by 
presenting political interests ‘as what is objectively right’.16 With this, Kelsen 
had developed a real-typical photonegative of the ideal-typical, positivist legal 
scholar characterised in his later article of 1951. With his deep concern for 
the politicisability of international legal scholarship as a political instrument 
of scientific justification, Kelsen proved that he was by no means a utopian, 
whose pure doctrine of law existed only beyond the realities of the political 
world. Rather, by pointing to the politicisability of legal scholarship, Kelsen an-
ticipated a core statement of current critical legal theory:17 Norms and lawyers 
‘both justify and enable the critique of established practices.’18
Here, an important caveat to Kant’s project of international legalisation 
was voiced through Kelsen’s criticism: More law is not necessarily better 
law. Legalisation is not necessarily an evidence for an objective ‘progress’ in 
the sense of Kant’s telos. Rather, law is always politicisable, part of political 
projects – even a political project itself (demanded by reason), as Walter 
Benjamin put it.19 The professional lawyer is ultimately always political. This 
does not only apply to ‘first order’ scholars in close proximity to political or 
15   Kleingeld, Pauline. ‘What do the Virtuous Hope for? Re-reading Kant’s Doctrine of the 
Highest Good’, in Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress: Memphis, 1995, 
eds. Hoke Robinson (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995). On Kelsen’s proj-
ect of positivism, see also García-Salmones Rovira, Mónica. The Project of Positivism in 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Chapters 4–6.
16   Kelsen, Hans. ‘Juristischer Formalismus und Reine Rechtslehre’. Juristische Wochenschrift 
58(3) (1929), 1723–1726, 1723; see also Bernstorff, Jochen von. ‘International Legal 
Scholarship as a Cooling Medium in International Law and Politics’. European Journal of 
International Law 25(4) (2014), 977–990, 977, doi: 10.1093/ejil/chu073.
17   Carty, Anthony. ‘Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International 
Law’. European Journal of International Law 2(1) (1991), 1–27; Singh, Prabhakar and Benoît 
Mayer, eds. Critical International Law. Postrealism, Postcolonialism, and Transnationalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
18   Koskenniemi, Martti. ‘What is Critical Research in International Law? Celebrating 
Structuralism’. Leiden Journal of International Law 29(3) (2016), 727–735, 731.
19   Benjamin, Walter. ‘Critique of Violence’, in Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz (Boston: Harcourt, 1978), 277. See also Brock, 
Lothar and Hendrik Simon. ‘Die Selbstbehauptung und Selbstgefährdung des Friedens als 
Herrschaft des Rechts’. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 59(2) (2018), 269–291.
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legal practice, but also to ‘second order’ scholars who keep their critical aca-
demic distance from practice.20 For neither are universities or academic insti-
tutes apolitical spaces, nor can scholars isolate themselves from the historical, 
socio-political, or economic contexts in which they think and act.21
Much in this vein, Anne Peters has stated convincingly that a ‘complete val-
ue-free academic activity appears impossible, because any kind of statement 
and any interpretation are pre-structured by the speaker’s Vorverständnis’ 
(preliminary understanding).22 Even legal positivism may be regarded as a 
political project. As Benedict Kingsbury has argued with reference to Lassa 
Oppenheim, it is supported normatively ‘as being the best conception of law 
for the realization of higher normative goals relating to peace, order, certain 
forms of justice, and the legal control of violence.’23 Or, in Oppenheim’s own 
words: ‘The science of international law (…) is merely a means to certain ends 
outside itself.’24
Accordingly, Martti Koskenniemi concludes: ‘The choice is not between 
law and politics, but between one politics of law, and another. Everything is 
at stake, but not for everyone.’25 This is also due to the fact that the decision 
on what is scholarly ‘objective’ and which legal theories and sources are ac-
cepted depends – like everything created by humans – on historical context.26 
The very existence of different theoretical schools,27 the rise and fall of schol-
arly authority, of mainstreams and orthodoxies, foster Foucauldian scepticism 
20   For the distinction between ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ scholarship see Bernstorff, 
Cooling Medium 2014 (n. 16), 990.
21   Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft 2017 (n. 7); Foucault, L’Archéologie 1969 (n. 10); Weber, Max. 
‘Wissenschaft als Beruf ’, in Max Weber, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 1, eds. Birgit Morgenbrod, 
Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Schluchter (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992); 
Horkheimer, Max. Traditionelle und kritische Theorie: Fünf Aufsätze (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer, 1992).
22   Peters, Anne. ‘International Legal Scholarship under Challenge’, in International Law as 
a Profession, eds. Jean d’Aspremont, Tarcisio Gazzini, André Nollkaemper and Wouter 
Werner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 117–159, 129.
23   Kingsbury, Benedict. ‘Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, 
Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law’. European Journal of 
International Law 13(2) (2002), 401–436. On Oppenheim’s project of positivism, see also 
García-Salmones, Project of Positivism 2013 (n. 15), Chapter 2.
24   Oppenheim, Lassa. ‘The Science of International Law: Its Tasks and Method’. American 
Journal of International Law 2(2) (1908), 313–356, 314, quoted after Kingsbury, Legal 
Positivism 2002 (n. 23), 403.
25   Koskenniemi, Martti. ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’. 
European Journal of International Law 16(1) (2005), 113–124, 123.
26   Peters, Scholarship 2017 (n. 22), 134.
27   For an overview, see Orford, Anne and Florian Hoffmann, eds. The Oxford Handbook of the 
Theory of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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towards an impartial genesis of knowledge in underlining the inner and outer 
‘politics of expertise’.28 There is no escape from politics in the science of law.
So, does that mean that law – perhaps not in its inner logic, but rather through 
the politicisability of legal knowledge – in the end is only politics, as Realists 
and critical legal scholars tell us?29 After all, researching ‘politicisation’ – 
defined as ‘making previously unpolitical matters political’30 – in an already 
highly politicised field of knowledge might seem useless at best. For a theoreti-
cal answer, insights from constructivist norm research might help. According 
to these insides, law is indeed politics, and legal knowledge is always also po-
litical knowledge, but not only: Law possesses a certain logic of its own, which 
eludes too crude manipulation and abuse of law – something, which Lothar 
Brock has referred to as the intrinsic limits of the political instrumentalisation 
of law. Following Brock, the essential unavailability (Unverfügbarkeit) of law 
results from the fact that law can only serve as a political instrument as long as 
a relevant audience is acknowledging its normative meaning as law:31 ‘Those 
who use the language of law submit to the logic of law, because otherwise the 
reference to law would remain politically ineffective. Every reference to law is 
therefore an act of self-binding to law.’32 Accordingly, despite its highly politi-
cal nature, law is more than a mere continuation of politics by other means. 
Instead, the politics of legal knowledge, as I grasp them here, are defined as a 
scholar’s deliberate ignorance, avoidance or selective application of interna-
tional legal normativity because of extra-legal, i.e. political preferences.
Thus, the critical analysis proposed here aims at deconstructing these de-
liberate scholars’ subordinations of law under politics and the justificatory 
strategy behind them. For this, I propose a reflexive analysis of historical dis-
courses on war, politics and the histories of international law in the sense of 
Reinhart Koselleck: As Koselleck described it, writing history scientifically is 
28   Kennedy, David W. ‘The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance and 
the Politics of Expertise’. European Human Rights Law Review 463(5) (2001), 463–497.
29   See, e. g., Hurd, Ian. How to Do Things with International Law. A Provocative Reassessment 
of the Rule of Law in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
30   Zürn, Michael. ‘The Politicization of World Politics and its Effects: Eight Propositions’. 
European Political Science Review 6(1) (2014), 47–71, 50.
31   Brock, Lothar. ‘Frieden durch Recht. Anmerkungen zum Thema im historischen Kontext’, 
in Frieden durch Recht?, eds. Peter Becker, Reiner Braun and Dieter Deiseroth (Berlin: 
Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010), 15–34. See also Brock/Simon, Selbstbehauptung 2018 
(n. 19) and Forst, Rainer. Normativity and Power: Analyzing Social Orders of Justification 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
32   Brock, Lothar. ‘Frieden durch Recht. Zur Verteidigung einer Idee gegen die “harten 
Tatsachen“ der internationalen Politik’. Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 
Standpunkte 18(3) (2004), 8; Brock, Frieden durch Recht 2010 (n. 31).
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simply impossible without theory formation on ‘possible histories’. It depends 
on the historian’s Standpunkt, his ideological biases. At the same time, how-
ever, the scholar’s Standpunkt is limited by the fact that historical (and legal) 
sources have a Vetorecht (veto power).33 It describes the possibility of (other) 
scholars to reject obviously wrong, i.e. untenable historical (or legal) interpre-
tations and theories through source criticism. The task of a critical science of 
(the politics of) international law could therefore be to recognise the political 
character of law as well as its essential political unavailability, and to take on 
a mediating position of law as political and apolitical: In Anne Peters’ words, 
‘scholars might acknowledge that an ambivalence between normative and 
positive analysis characterises international legal scholarship, and that this 
ambivalence embodies a tension which can be productive.’34
Even more: In writing histories of international law and its politics, these am-
bivalences increase, as we are not only confronted with our own standpoints, 
but also with those of the authors we write about. Nonetheless, reconstruct-
ing these Standpunkte developed by lawyers in specific historical contexts may 
help us to better understand not only the role of legal scholars in the field of 
tension between objective impartiality and political interests, but also the 
authority, politicisability and essential political unavailability of law. In order 
to stimulate such political-sociological perspectives on legal knowledge and 
modern justifications of war, the next section develops a short genealogy of 
the formation of (parts of) the modern war discourse and investigates the role 
of international legal knowledge in this genesis. For this, I turn to 19th-century 
Europe.
3 Politics, 19th-Century Legal Scholarship and the Birth of the 
Modern War Discourse
Liberal histories of legal progress classically recognise the 19th century war 
discourses as pre-modern and anarchical, followed by a ‘New World Order’ 
in the 20th century. In The Internationalists, Oona A. Hathaway und Scott J. 
Shapiro claim that in the ‘Old World Order’ prior to the legal prohibition of war 
in 1928, war was ‘simply a continuation of politics by other means’ – ‘might was 
right’.35 However, as I have argued elsewhere, the widespread positivist thesis 
of a ‘free right to go to war’ (liberum ius ad bellum) does not stand up to a closer 
33   Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft 2017 (n. 7).
34   Peters, Scholarship 2017 (n. 22), 134.
35   Hathaway/Shapiro, The Internationalists 2017 (n. 5), xv.
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examination of 19th-century legal theory and political practice; it constitutes a 
Clausewitzian myth (or fallacy) in the History of International Law.36
In terms of the international normative order governing the use of force, 
the 19th century was not a century of anarchy. Instead, following the French 
Revolution(ary Wars), the long 19th century witnessed the birth of the modern 
discourse of war, normativity and international order.37 While there existed 
no general legal prohibition of war, ‘the preservation of the peace of Europe’ 
became a desired norm both in legal theory and political practice. Although 
wars of aggression (if in different definitions of the term) have been regard-
ed as illegitimate throughout human history,38 now – in the 19th century – 
political and theoretical efforts to achieve a positive ius contra bellum were 
made for the first time.
However, in addition to legalisation, non-legal spheres also kept their dis-
cursive power in 19th century war discourses: inter alia morality, politics, so-
cial custom, economics, and, to an increasing extent, nationalism. My thesis 
is therefore that to this day the modern discourse of war is shaped by ‘multi- 
normativity’39 and that for lawyers, this normative plurality poses both sci-
entific challenges and political opportunities. Accordingly, the 19th-century 
legal-political debates on the use of force in the ambivalent interplay between 
nationalism40 and internationalism are closer to the present than usually as-
sumed. This makes it an ideal starting point for reflecting on the politics of 
legal knowledge and the justification of force in modernity.
3.1 Revolutionary Mind-Sets: International Legal Scholarship at the 
Dawn of the ‘Long 19th Century’
When in 1796 German legal scholar Georg Friedrich Martens was comment-
ing on recent developments in international law, he recognised the dialec-
tic liaison between violence and (international) order: The war discourse in 
Revolutionary France had been radicalised. It challenged the acceptance of 
36   Simon, Hendrik. ‘The Myth of Liberum Ius ad Bellum: Justifying War in 19th-Century 
Legal Theory and Political Practice’. European Journal of International Law 29(1) (2018), 
113–136, doi: 10.1093/ejil/chy009. I have developed this argument in more detail in Simon, 
Hendrik. Der Mythos vom „freien Recht zum Krieg‟. Zu einer Genealogie der modernen 
Kriegslegitimation (forthcoming).
37   Ibid.
38   Ibid.; Tischer, Herrschaftskommunikation 2012 (n. 3); Lesaffer, Randall. ‘Aggression before 
Versailles’. European Journal of International Law 29(3) (2018), 773–808, doi: 10.1093/ejil/
chy038. See also the contributions in Brock/Simon, Justification of War forthcoming (n. 1).
39   Vec, Multinormativität 2009 (n. 11).
40   Berman, Nathaniel. Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism, and International 
Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012).
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shared practices, sources and principles of international law. Nationalism was 
spreading. Martens through his close connections with the Hanover Electorate 
was a legal and political representative of the old international order in one 
way or another.41 To him, the revolution and its natural-law principles seemed 
to endanger the society of sovereign states.42 From Martens’ conservative and 
positivist point of view, the revolutionary thinkers could not be taken seri-
ously. Their natural law principles were developed essentially along concrete 
conflicts, not in abstract treatises: The justification of violence against the first 
of seven enemy coalitions (1792–1815) was debated in the French National 
Assembly. As many delegates were lawyers or philosophers – some of them 
publishing on politics and law –, political practice and legal/political theory 
were to some extent interwoven in these debates. Although widely ignored in 
the History of International Law,43 the legal ideas of French Revolutionaries 
shaped the modern war discourse significantly.
While the revolutionary discourse on the use of force was pacifist in its early 
phase, this peaceful mantle was quickly thrown off. Now a narrative became 
central, which would challenge the international order for the entire 19th cen-
tury: the principle of popular sovereignty.44 In April 1792, revolutionaries both 
scandalised the alleged threat of a military intervention by Austria and Prussia 
and at the same time justified their ‘counter violence’ au nom de la Nation. 
After the Declaration of Pillnitz, the French nation was to be protected from 
monarchical interference. For this, the doctrine of ‘just war’ was modified: In 
1792, this meant to justify preventive self-defence.
Particularly interesting for the French legal war discourse is Philippe 
Antoine Merlin de Douai, un jurist en politique experienced both in legal theo-
ry and practice.45 In 1790, he justified an early case of French annexations, the 
case of Alsace: After having interpreted old international treaty law in favour 
of France, Merlin de Douai rejected this very treaty law as an ‘old language’ 
41   Koskenniemi, Martti. ‘Into Positivism: Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756–1821) and 
Modern International Law’. Constellations 15(2) (2008), 189–207.
42   Martens, Georg Friedrich von. Einleitung in das positive Europäische Völkerrecht auf 
Verträge und Herkommen gegründet (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1796), 297.
43   Lesaffer, Randall. ‘In the Embrace of France. An Introduction’, in In the Embrace of 
France: The Law of Nations and Constitutional Law in the French Satellite States of the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Age (1789–1815), eds. Beatrix Jacobs, Raymund Kubben and 
Randall Lesaffer (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 7–14, 1, 7–14.
44   Yack, Bernard. ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’. Political Theory 29(4) (2011), 517–
536; Kolla, Edward J. Sovereignty, International Law, and the French Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017).
45   Leuwers, Hervé. Un Juriste en Politique: Merlin de Douai, 1754–1838 (Arras: Artois Presses 
Université, 1996).
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not to be used anymore. ‘The law of nations is not founded on the treaties of 
princes’. Instead, he referred to the ‘sovereignty of the people’ in Alsace and the 
will of the Alsatian people to unite with the French.46 As Hervé Leuwers and 
Edward J. Kolla have shown, Merlin de Douai argued as a politicised lawyer, not 
only in so far, as he adopted the normative language of the French Revolution – 
but also because of the fact that he was willing to propose to the German 
princes indemnities for Alsace instead of insisting on a consequent, ‘objective’ 
application of revolutionary law.
Another important example of the French Revolution’s impact on theoreti-
cal war discourses is Immanuel Kant as a modern thinker on ‘peace through 
legal progress’: From a Königsberger distance, Kant witnessed the unfolding of 
the revolution with mixed feelings. On the one hand, he hoped for democrati-
sation and legalisation of human relations through the proliferation of reason 
in open discourse. The telos of his normative project was a republican con-
stitution. Thus, Kant had sympathies for the revolutionary ideas of prohibit-
ing wars of aggression, which seemed to indicate the emergence of a peaceful 
republic. This meant that Kant was hostile to a forceful spread of the revolu-
tion via conquest.47 He neither accepted wars justified by natural law nor by 
political interests.
On the other hand, however, recent studies argue that Kant was not only en-
thusiastic about the revolution and indifferent to the execution of King Louis 
XVI,48 but – while denying a right to resistance against a self-determined and 
liberal legislation – he also assumed a right to resist tyrants and despots act-
ing against the law.49 The latter assumption is plausible insofar as Kant toler-
ated revolutionary violence if it resulted in an adequate constitution.50 Kant’s 
idea of law was that it would overcome violence – but at the same time he 
accepted political violence embedded in legal emancipation. The dialectics of 
the Enlightenment become plainly apparent here. If even the legal-theoretical 
thinking of Kant was not entirely free of the politics of his time, it is reasonable 
to assume that multi-normativity would prevail in 19th century legal thinking 
46   Kolla, Sovereignty 2017 (n. 44), 64–66.
47   Kant, Immanuel. Project for a Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (London: Couchman, 
1796).
48   Paula Oliveira, Maria Lúcia de. ‘Compatibility of the Moral Foundation of Law in Kant 
with the Theory of Reflective Judgment and with the Kantian Theory of Revolution’, in 
Kant’s Theory of Law, eds. Jean-Christophe Merle and Alexandre Trivisonno (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015), 35–44.
49   Pfordten, Dietmar von der. ‘Kant on the Right of Resistance’, in Merle/Trivisonno, Kant 
2015 (n. 48), 101–119.
50   Eberl, Oliver and Peter Niesen. Immanuel Kant. Zum ewigen Frieden und Auszüge aus der 
Rechtslehre –Kommentare (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2011), 291.
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on war and peace: With Kant, positive law became the new theology of the 
normative discourse of modernity51 – and legal scholars became its priests. 
However, convinced as they may have been – these priests always had other 
gods beside them. Nationalism was one of them.
3.2 The (Dis-)Unity of Law: Nationalism, War and Legal Scholarship in 
the 19th Century
When the principle of self-determination underpinning the French 
Revolutionary Wars shook up Europe’s international order, the Great Powers 
aimed at restoring order at the Congress of Vienna. ‘Vienna 1814/15’ became 
a ‘decisive turning point’ of international history:52 From now on, multilater-
al diplomacy was to guarantee a general European peace between the Great 
Powers. Political conflicts were to be judged in ‘perfect concert’;53 unilateral 
warfare beyond the consensus of the Great Powers became inacceptable. Of 
course, the use of force remained the object of a highly political discourse, but 
at the same time, legal rules and behavioural norms played an important role – 
and lawyers became central actors in ordering this discourse.54
Perhaps the Concert’s central construction error was its mismanagement 
of social conflicts: The Great Powers nullified the revolutionary legal principle 
of self-determination. Yet, they could not expel it from the Zeitgeist.55 Social 
conflicts did not simply disappear. As Jürgen Osterhammel has put it: The 19th 
century may not have been a century of nation states (instead of empires), 
but it was a century of nationalism as an emerging political mythology.56 
Nationalism both delegitimised the existing legal order of empires and pro-
moted an international order based on the nation state.57 This becomes ap-
parent in the fact that war was the first instrument of choice for achieving 
nationalist unification as in the German Unification Wars and the Italian 
51   Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1990).
52   Schroeder, Paul W. The Transformation of European Politics. 1763–1848 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), vii.
53   Schulz, Matthias. Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als 
Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 4.
54   Simon, Myth 2018 (n. 36); Payk, Frieden durch Recht? 2018 (n. 3).
55   Fisch, Jörg. A History of the Self-Determination of Peoples: The Domestication of an Illusion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 105.
56   Osterhammel, Jürgen. The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
57   Summers, James. Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-Determination 
Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007).
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Risorgimento, and that nationalism finally devastated the European Concert 
in the Great War.
Starting from this contribution’s core thesis that legal scholarship is open to 
politicisation, it comes as no surprise that especially in the German and Italian 
territories legal doctrines referred to the principles of self-determination and 
nationalism. An important theoretical source was Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s 
historical school of law and its ‘supranational historicism’.58 Savigny, a German 
conservative and cosmopolitan lawyer, believed in the lawyer’s task to reflect 
on the ‘legal conscience’ of a national culture (Volksgeist).59 Accordingly, Völker 
should become the prime actors in international law.
This historical school was influential particularly among 19th-century liber-
al nationalist legal scholars like Mancini, Bluntschli or Lieber.60 While Savigny 
himself was sceptical about German nationalism at his time, his followers 
more and more reconciled liberalism and (moderate) nationalism. This liaison 
between liberalism and nationalism seems contradictory from a later point of 
view and the collective memory of two World Wars. Already in 1910, Westlake 
would warn that nationalities, ‘though often important in politics, must be 
kept outside of international law’.61 Yet the liaison was logically plausible in the 
mid-19th century as multinational empires were at the time the most illiberal 
states and nationalism could be seen as an emancipatory mission.62
Accordingly, the appeal that European ‘civilised’ peoples had the right to 
unite had an anti-imperial impetus. The Italian Pasquale Stanislao Mancini 
referred to the French Revolution and argued in favour of peoples’ moral and 
legal right to unite in a state.63 In fact, liberal lawyers usually did not under-
stand nationalism and internationalism as contradicting, but as consecutive 
principles. But the lawyers’ ‘reflexive relationship’ with the Volk,64 as Savigny 
had described it, also made liberal lawyers become more and more commit-
ted to national, and, with this, to political projects. From now on, it made a 
political difference whether someone was a German, French or Russian inter-
national lawyer.
58   Koskenniemi, Martti. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 
1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 45; Shahabuddin, Mohammad. 
Ethnicity and International Law. Histories, Politics and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 53.
59   Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer 2002 (n. 58), 45.
60   Summers, Peoples and International Law 2007 (n. 57), 112.
61   Ibid., 157.
62   Ibid.
63   Kolla, Sovereignty 2017 (n. 44), 294.
64   Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer 2002 (n. 58), 43.
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Furthermore, liberal scholars began to accept political violence as a means of 
legal progress. With this, Kelsen’s boundaries between law and politics became 
blurred. Particularly revealing are the writings of German (speaking) liberal 
lawyers in the context of the German Wars of Unification. An important exam-
ple is Swiss lawyer Johann Caspar Bluntschli, professor in Heidelberg and later 
one of the founding members of the Institut de Droit International: Bluntschli 
wrote in Kant’s legal pacifist tradition. Accordingly, he strove for a complete 
legalisation of war in the sense of a positive ius contra bellum. Bluntschli be-
came a main opponent of those German legal scholars who would recognise 
war as a Clausewitzian political instrument.65 A war for political reasons was to 
be rejected, wrote Bluntschli: ‘The mere interest of the state in itself does not 
justify war.’66 In this respect, he perfectly corresponded to Kelsen’s ideal type of 
a legal scholar advocating the de-politicisation of law.
However, Bluntschli not only sympathised with Bismarck’s unification pol-
icy from a scholarly distance, he also justified it as a member of the Baden 
Parliament. In this respect, he corresponded to Kelsen’s real type of a politicis-
able legal scholar. Even if Bluntschli rejected Rousseau’s Contrat Social as the 
basis of state theory, the analogy of his justification of Prussia’s wars to those of 
French revolutionary legal scholar Merlin de Douai is astonishing: Bluntschli 
wrote of the ‘holy, natural and important right’ of a Volk as a political com-
munity. The necessity of a contemporary reorganisation of the state was to be 
recognised and carried out. At the same time, the existence of the historically 
evolved law had to be protected as long as it was viable and contemporary, ar-
gued Bluntschli.67 Obviously, however, this also meant that positive law should 
not be regarded as sacrosanct. Rather, the Concert’s norms of restraint were 
to be abandoned when they proved to be out of date. According to Bluntschli, 
contesting emerging law (werdendes Recht) meant disregarding the ‘vital na-
ture of right’ (lebendige Natur des Rechts) and, thus, the further development 
of law as a means of ‘self-fulfilment of peoples’ (Entwicklung der Völker). In this 
understanding of law as a living body, Savigny’s impact on Bluntschli’s think-
ing becomes clear.
But Bluntschli also left Savigny clearly behind, as he was referring to nation-
alism and self-determination as narratives for the justification of the German 
Wars of Unification. This is remarkable: It is clear not only to subsequent 
65   Lueder, Karl. ‘Krieg und Kriegsrecht im Allgemeinen’, in Handbuch des Völkerrechts, ed. Franz 
von Holtzendorff (Berlin: Haber, 1889),169–397, 169, 180–184. See also Simon, Myth 2018 
(n. 36).
66   Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten: als Rechtsbuch 
dargestellt (Nördlingen: C.H. Beck, 1868), 290–291.
67   Ibid.
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historians, but it was also recognised by some contemporaries that Bismarck 
had planned the wars for a considerable time and unleashed them for purely 
political reasons – even though Bismarck tried to bring his policies into line 
with the norms of the European Concert. Bismarck tried to justify the war 
against France as a defensive war68 when Bismarck’s Realpolitik had already 
become obvious in the war of 1866, which had begun without a declaration 
of war.
Nevertheless, Bluntschli followed Bismarck in declaring the Franco-Prussian 
War as a defensive war.69 Furthermore, Bluntschli described Bismarck as one 
of the two most brilliant statesmen in German history – alongside Frederic 
the Great. What a curious admiration of a liberal lawyer for two of the most 
explicit representatives of Prussian Realpolitik! Bluntschli justified the violent 
integration of Schleswig and Holstein into the German Confederation (1864) 
as well as the 1866 war against Austria as an emancipatory act of a German na-
tion that ‘defends its right and honour’ (seine Ehre zu wahren, und daher sein 
Recht).70
Bluntschli’s justification was clearly based on an understanding of nations as 
catalysts for legal progress. While for Bluntschli a state did not have to be ethni-
cally homogeneous, it had to have a certain status of power and ‘civilization’.71 
As a cosmopolitan, Bluntschli sought to reconcile law, nationalism and liberal-
ism. In this context, violence was acceptable for the liberal cosmopolitan – if 
it served the right national purpose. With this, the analogies in Bluntschli’s 
and Merlin de Douai’s thinking become clear: Both delegitimised ‘old’, dynas-
tic international law in favour of a nation’s unity derived from natural law. 
According to Bluntschli, people had the right ‘to take the state-form necessary 
to develop its natural capacity, to fulfil its destiny, to ensure its security and to 
preserve its honour, and therefore the right to resort to arms if necessary.’ In 
his view, this was ‘a much more sacred, natural and important right than any 
dynastic law’.72 Like Merlin de Douai in 1790, Bluntschli advocated progress de 
lege ferenda, based on natural law, nationalism and political convictions. As 
68   Simon, Myth 2018 (n. 36).
69   Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. Das moderne Völkerrecht in dem Kriege 1870: Rede zum 
Geburtsfeste des höchstseligen Grossherzogs Karl Friedrich von Baden und zur akademischen 
Preisvertheilung am 22. November 1870 (Heidelberg: Mohr, 1870).
70   Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht 1868 (n. 66), 291.
71   Bluntschli, Johann Caspar. The Theory of the State (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1875), 94.
72   Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht 1868 (n. 66), 291.
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becomes evident here, multi-normativity was still alive in the war discourse of 
the so-called ‘positivist century’.73
Similarly – but from a different legal-theoretical perspective – liberal lawyer 
Rudolf von Jhering expressed sympathy for the German unification in private 
correspondences.74 What is remarkable here is Rudolf von Jhering’s inner con-
flict emerging from the tension between law, morality and his political sympa-
thy for Prussian nationalism, as expressed in a letter to Austrian lawyer Julius 
Glaser of 1 May 1866: Jhering, who described himself in the letter as an oppo-
nent of the Austrian political system – ‘but not of the Austrians’ –, wrote that 
perhaps no war had ever been started with a ‘shamelessness’ (Schamlosigkeit), 
‘a horrible frivolity’ (grauenhaften Frivolität), as the one Bismarck was trying to 
drum up against Austria at that time. Jhering was outraged at such ‘an offence 
against all the principles of law and morality’. However, he felt a contradiction 
between law and politics in himself: His sense of law (Rechtsgefühl) and his po-
litical interests had come into ‘a tragic conflict’, as he reported to Glaser. From 
a legal perspective, Jhering felt the duty to wish Austria luck in war. However, 
for political reasons, he felt the need to wish the ‘unjust cause’ – Prussia’s 
victory – success in the battlefield.
Obviously, there were two hearts pounding in Jhering’s chest, one political 
and one legal: Finally, Jhering’s political heart was to beat faster, as he informed 
Leipzig legal scholar Bernhard Joseph Hubert Windscheid in a letter of 15 June 
1866:75 He bowed to the genius of Bismarck, who had ‘delivered a political 
masterpiece’. And Jhering even mocked the powerless honesty and scientific 
objectivity of legal scholars: Full of national pride, Jhering concluded, for a 
political genius like Bismarck, he would give a hundred of liberals of powerless 
honesty. What a triumph of politics over law! Of course, these were private 
correspondences, not scientific treatises. And it is also true that Jhering was 
very open and reflective about his initial discomfort with his own euphoria 
about Prussia’s wars. Nevertheless, Jhering weighed between law and politics, 
and made a clear decision: Politics was it.
The arguments of Jhering and Bluntschli – two of the most important 
German liberal lawyers at their times – demonstrate that Kelsen would be 
right in his concern that legal scholars could become the mouthpiece of 
73   Vec, Miloš. ‘Sources in the 19th Century European Tradition: The Myth of Positivism’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, eds. Samantha Besson and Jean 
d’Aspremont (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 121–145.
74   Quoted according to Faber, Karl-Georg. ‘Realpolitik als Ideologie. Die Bedeutung des 
Jahres 1866 für das politische Denken in Deutschland’. Historische Zeitschrift 203(1) (1966), 
1–45.
75   Ibid.
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nationalist power politics. The devastating potentials of nationalism as a 
source of war justification became even clearer at the end of the century. As I 
have shown elsewhere,76 the unification of Germany – praised by liberal legal 
scholars – enabled the development of a German legal doctrine oriented to-
wards a Clausewitzian understanding of war, which placed Realpolitik above 
the need to contain war. This became obvious in German justifications of vio-
lence in the contexts of the Herero and Nama Genocide and the First World 
War.77 Of course, in the latter, lawyers of all nations succumbed to national-
ism. But particularly in German political and legal discourse, militarism and 
nationalism had now at last outdone liberalism – politics had won over law, 
Clausewitz over Kant.
3.3 Inventing Intervention, Circumventing Law: Another Normative 
Telos of Modernity
The prime instrument of the European Great Powers to counter emerging na-
tionalism was military intervention. What distinguished it from war was that 
a military intervention should not be conducted in the name of unilateral in-
terests, but in the name of the ‘international community’.78 Interventions thus 
were to enforce the norms of the Concert. In view of its highly political char-
acter, however, intervention was also repeatedly a test for Concert diplomacy. 
Particularly in legal doctrine, intervention became one of the most debated 
issues of the 19th century.79 It was poorly regulated not to stand in the way of 
the Concert’s interests: The vocabulary of positive law was not to become a 
language barrier for politics.
In the course of the 19th century, a new type of intervention emerged as 
part of dealing with the Oriental Question: ‘humanitarian intervention’.80 
According to Russian lawyer Fedor Fedorovich Martens, a military interven-
tion was justifiable following the ‘commonality of religious interests and 
76   Simon, Myth 2018 (n. 36).
77   Hull, Isabel V. Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial 
Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Hull, Isabel V. A Scrap of Paper: Breaking 
and Making International Law during the Great War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2014).
78   Schulz, Normen und Praxis 2009 (n. 53).
79   Vec, Miloš. ‘Intervention / Nichtintervention, Verrechtlichung der Politik und Politisierung 
des Völkerrechts im 19. Jahrhundert’, in Macht und Recht. Völkerrecht in den internationalen 
Beziehungen, eds. Ulrich Lappenküper and Reiner Marcowitz (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2010), 135–160.
80   Rougier, Antoine. ‘La Théorie de l’Intervention d’Humanité’. Revue Génerale de Droit 
International Public 17 (1910), 468–526.
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the commandments of humanity, that is the principles of natural law’. The 
Eurocentric focus of intervention came to light when Martens added that an 
intervention was explicitly legitimate ‘in Turkey, China, Japan and other Asian 
states’ if the Christian population was subjected to persecution or ‘slaughter’.81
In the debates on ‘humanitarian interventions’, international lawyers played 
a central role, as can be illustrated with a view to the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877/78: With the Crimean War of 1853–56, the Oriental Question had inter-
rupted, but not destroyed the Vienna Peace Order. The defeat of the Russians 
against the alliance of the Ottoman Empire, England, France and Piedmont-
Sardinia was clearly expressed in the Peace Treaty of 1856. Article 9 of the 
treaty prohibited intervention in the territory of the Ottoman Empire; this 
was backed by the assurance on the part of the Ottoman Sultan to improve 
the situation of the Christian population in the Balkan regions. Article 7 for-
mally granted the Ottoman Empire participation in the European community 
of international law and in the Concert of the Great Powers, although it did 
not de facto grant it the status of a European Great Power. These provisions 
of the Treaty of Paris amounted to a regional ban on intervention which was 
clearly directed against Russian war policies. According to the peace treaty, 
positive international law denied Russia the right to intervene into what was 
to be considered as the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, 
on 24 April 1877, Russian Tsar Alexander II declared war on the Sublime Porte 
after Turkish armed forces had suppressed uprisings in their Balkan areas in 
the spring of 1876 using extensive force and killing numerous civilians in the 
so-called Bulgarian Horrors.
It is not surprising that the legal ban on intervention formulated in the 
treaty as positive law was invoked as a normative obstacle to the justification 
of the Russian use of force. Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov 
summed up the Russian denial of the norm by claiming that ‘the European 
action in Turkey has been reduced to impotency by the stipulations of 1856’.82 
According to Gorchakov, Turkey’s independence had to be subordinated to 
‘interests of humanity, the Christian community and general peace’.83 Russia 
was successful with its strategy to invalidate Article 9 of the Peace of 1856 after 
the victorious war against the Ottomans: In the Berlin Treaty of 1878, the norm 
81   Martens, Friedrich von. Völkerrecht. Das internationale Recht der civilisirten Nationen 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1883), 302.
82   Gortschakow, 19th November 1876, in The Map of Europe by Treaty. Showing the Various 
Political and Territorial Changes which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 
1814. With Numerous Maps and Notes, Vol. 4: 1875–1891, ed. Edward Hertslet (London: 
Butterworths, 1891), 2523.
83   Gortschakow, 19th November 1877, in Hertslet, Map of Europe 1891 (n. 82), 2524.
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of non-intervention into the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire was aban-
doned. This was the political side of the matter.
As to the academic side, Fedor Fedorovich Martens, law professor and dip-
lomat in St. Petersburg, was entrusted with the task of investigating Russian 
politics scientifically – or, rather, with justifying it? Martens’ dual profes-
sional role84 is particularly interesting here: On the one hand, he was a legal 
scholar highly respected throughout Europe. On the other hand, Martens was 
crown jurist of the Russian Tsar as well as diplomat of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry. Thus, he was recognised as ‘the most legal-minded of diplomats and 
the most expert diplomat among lawyers’.85 In a 46-page ‘historical study’ pub-
lished in West and Central European journals in 1877, Martens examined the 
Russian ‘intervention’ in the Ottoman Empire. In his study, Martens argued 
that the protection of Christians in Turkey was a pan-European responsibility. 
However, since the Great Powers were disunited, Russia had a ‘moral and legal 
right to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs’.86 With this argument, Martens 
attempted to disguise Russia’s political interests in the Balkans by referring to 
the humanitarian task of the international community.
Like Gorchakov, Martens referred in particular to Article 9 of the 1856 peace 
treaty and the Sultan’s voluntary concessions therein to improve the lot of the 
Christian population: According to Martens, Russia had only signed the trea-
ty in 1856 because the European Concert had assumed the right of collective 
intervention in Russia’s place. Thus, in Martens’ view the Treaty of Paris had 
neither left Christians to ‘Muslim fanaticism’ nor abolished ‘Europe’s right to 
intervene’.87 If Europe did not exert its right, the powers particularly involved 
in the Oriental question were free to intervene – the article could not be in-
terpreted differently, Martens argued.88 Martens constructed a Russian right 
and obligation to intervene in the Ottoman Empire, for which he combined 
historical law – in particular the Treaty of Kütschük-Kainardschi of 1774 – and 
religious rights of Christians.
What is striking, however, is that Martens did not fully discuss Article 9 
of the Treaty of Paris in his essay. He simply ignored its ban of interventions. 
84   Mälksoo, Lauri. ‘F. F. Martens and His Time: When Russia Was an Integral Part of the 
European Tradition of International Law’. European Journal of International Law 25(3) 
(2014), 811–829.
85   Eyffinger, Arthur. The 1907 Hague Peace Conference: ‘The Conscience of the Civilized World’ 
(The Hague: Judicap, 2007), 29.
86   Martens, Friedrich von. Die russische Politik in der Orientalischen Frage. Eine historische 
Studie (St. Petersburg: H. Schmitzdorff, 1877), 45 et seq. (italics in the original).
87   Ibid., 19.
88   Ibid., 15.
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Moreover, a comparison of Martens’ argumentation in his ‘historical study’ 
and his scientific textbook on international law of 1883 reveals an interesting 
self-contradiction: In 1877, Martens denied the fact that the treaty of 1856 had 
established a legal prohibition of unilateral intervention into the Ottoman 
Empire. In the second volume of his 1883 textbook, however, Martens criticised 
the 1856 treaty precisely for having abolished the right both of collective and 
unilateral intervention.89 This criticism presupposes, of course, that Martens 
recognised the non-intervention norm set out in 1856 as legally binding. Even 
Martens’ observation that Europe had turned to illegal politics of intervention 
in the Orient before with the French occupation of Syria in 1860, on closer 
examination turns into an argument against his own reasoning: The inter-
vention of 1860 was preceded by negotiations between the Great Powers and 
the Ottoman Empire, in which – as Martens himself admitted – the Ottoman 
Empire agreed to an intervention.90 Moreover, the accusation that Europe had 
broken the non-intervention norm of 1856 in 1860 seems downright absurd in 
view of the fact that Martens himself ignored this prohibition of military inter-
vention in his study of 1877.
In any case, Martens’ remarks were incompatible with the positive law 
of the normative sub-order of 1856. Martens simply became an apologist of 
Alexander’s II politics of war: In his argumentation, international law and poli-
tics are inseparable. Martens’ study can be understood as a justification for 
the offensive Russian policy towards the Orient. Instead of a legal scientific 
study of positive law, Martens presented a political treatise. Martens even op-
posed the attempt of other members of the Institut de Droit to publicly pro-
test Russian excesses of violence and its violations of positive law during the 
campaign – ironically, he did so in the name of ‘scientific neutrality’.91 Even 
though, from a methodological perspective, Martens’ argumentation is highly 
interesting: He mixed alleged historical law (customs) and natural law in order 
to delegitimise the treaty law of 1856. At the same time, the new positive legal 
norm of 1878 was scientifically fleshed out with reference to natural law and 
historical customs of civilised states.
Martens’ claim that his study was not ‘to influence the judgment of our 
readers’92 seems hardly credible – for the true intentions of Martens’ study were 
revealed in the introduction to the German translation in the Russische Revue: 
Accordingly, the aim of the publication was ‘to eliminate the still widespread 
89   Martens, Völkerrecht 1883 (n. 81), 127.
90   Martens, Russische Politik 1877 (n. 86), 21.
91   Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe 2005 (n. 25), 124.
92   Martens, Russische Politik 1877 (n. 86), 2.
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misconceptions about Russia’s oriental politics and its goals in the Orient.’93 In 
fact, politics had triumphed over scholarly ‘objectivity’ here. Again, natural law 
had become the most important instrument to enforce political goals and to 
circumvent positive law. In the 19th century, it remained a substitute religion 
for the priests of positive law.
4 Conclusion and Outlook: The Multi-Normativity of Legal 
Knowledge in the Modern War Discourse
The starting point of this article was a distinction between ‘objective’ and 
‘political’ scholars developed based on some of Hans Kelsen’s works. The 
politicisability of legal scholars was first discussed at a theoretical level and 
then illustrated by analysing discursive fragments from the modern discourse 
of war and international order in its epoch of birth, the ‘long 19th century’. This 
was done without any claim to provide the last word on the issue, but rather 
to (re-)open this exciting field of research by demonstrating the fuzziness of 
the borderlines between legal and political discourse. Of course, I could only 
address individual examples as ‘illustrations’ of the politicisability of interna-
tional legal scholars here; however, these illustrations refer to lawyers/ legal 
thinkers who were particularly respected in their times.
Thus, what can be concluded here is quite remarkable: Firstly, all legal schol-
ars examined in this article were politicisable in the sense of Hans Kelsen’s 
real type. Some of them confessed their political projects, if with a certain un-
easiness: During the German Wars of Unification, Jhering felt both a legal and 
a political heart beating in his chest. In contrast, Fedor Fedorovich Martens 
tried to disguise his political objectives by claiming ‘scientific objectivity’. The 
misuse of the latter helped to suppress the intrinsic value of law and even to 
marginalise scientific opponents in the name of scientific neutrality – just as 
Kelsen would criticise.
Secondly, there is an astonishing similarity in the justification strategies of 
the legal scholars examined: Merlin de Douai, Bluntschli, Jhering and Martens 
all justified breaches of positive law in accord with their political programs 
by pointing to a plurality of normative arguments, be it natural law, national-
ism, self-determination, custom, honour, or even openly formulated political 
interests. Furthermore, lege ferenda was played out against lege lata. As can 
be clearly observed here, the modern war discourse, which emerged in the 
93   Ibid., 1.
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so-called ‘positivist 19th century’,94 is characterised by multi-normativity. This 
has considerable effects on legal scholarship and its politicisability.
In order to return to the starting point of this symposium: What do these 
paradoxes tell us about the relationship between law and politics? Firstly, that 
law is politically contested,95 and that legal scholars are political actors in the 
struggle for law (Jhering). Lawyers are not only affected by the shadow of war, 
it is also lawyers who turn this shadow into a smokescreen. Secondly, it is worth 
looking twice at who is speaking in legal discourse, from which Standpunkt 
and with what arguments, and how law is dealt with as a political instrument 
and as a politically unavailable phenomenon.96 Deconstructing the frequent 
political projects behind legal knowledge helps us to better grasp the fateful 
liaison between violence, politics and law.97
Thus, a broader comparison of historical case studies in the sense of a po-
litical sociology of international legal knowledge in the field of justifying force 
could provide us with patterns about when and why scholars throughout mo-
dernity were susceptible to politicisation (or not). Perhaps it could even help 
us to answer the question whether we are ‘better off than those colleagues who 
set up the profession of international law’ 147 years ago’98 – insofar as the refer-
ence to expanding positive law and particularly the legal prohibition of force 
in Art 2 (4) UN Charter might enable ‘us’ to oppose arbitrary politicisation of 
legal knowledge more effectively and in the sense of Koselleck’s Vetorecht.99
But then again, would not this reference to positivism be politically moti-
vated itself, as Lassa Oppenheim admitted? So, are we moving in circles in our 
attempt to do justice to Kelsen’s ideal of an apolitical researcher – and should 
we possibly abandon this ideal altogether? Or is it worth bearing this ambiva-
lence of science and politics – and if so, for whom?
Part of my argument in this article with its focus on the 19th century was 
that narratives of progress or the impossibility of progress in the face of eternal 
94   Critically on this term Vec, Sources 2017 (n. 73).
95   For the concept of ‘contestation’ in the Theory of International Relations, see Wiener, 
Antje. Contestation and Constitution of Norms in Global International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
96   Brock, Frieden durch Recht 2010 (n. 31).
97   Benjamin, Critique 1978 (n. 19); Foucault, L’archéologie 1969 (n. 10); Brock/Simon, 
Selbstbehauptung 2018 (n. 19).
98   Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe 2005 (n. 25),
99   Critically on this issue Peevers, Charlotte. The Politics of Justifying Force. The Suez Crisis, 
the Iraq War, and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); see also 
Marauhn, Thilo. ‘How Many Deaths Can Art 2 (4) UN Charter Die?’, in The Justification of 
War and International Order. From Past to Present, eds. Lothar Brock and Hendrik Simon 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
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anarchy are always deceptive. As could only be indicated here, in light of the 
fact that the 19th century is not an anarchic mirror-image of the modern dis-
course of war and international order, but rather marks its beginning,100 the 
‘radical’ plans to outlaw war101 of 1920, 1928 or 1945 appear much less radical 
seen from a perspective of longue durée.102 Thus, the cases described here are 
more than anecdotes – in their logic of justification of war they appear as part 
of our present. Nationalism and multi-normativity are still with us. A glance at 
more recent scholarly justifications of the use of force – regarding the NATO-
intervention in Kosovo (1999), the Iraq War (2003) or the Russian annexation 
of the Crimea (2014) – seems to confirm Kelsen’s concern: Legal scholars can 
always be the mouthpieces of the powerful – and thus not only gentle civilis-
ers, but at the same time gentle justifiers of violence.
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